Why We All Believe in 'Identity Politics'

Sonia Sotomayor’s nomination to the Supreme Court this week has renewed a debate about “identity politics,” primarily because of comments she has made about the role of gender and race in judicial decision-making, and President Obama’s continued emphasis on “empathy” as a characteristic for which he was looking in his selection.

The problem with the current debate, and the conventional understanding of identity politics, is that it usually misunderstands what identity politics actually means, and the fact that all of us practice identity politics (including all of the justices already on the Supreme Court).

Commonly understood, identity politics is the idea that belonging to a certain group makes a person uniquely qualified to represent that group, or that political decisions are (and should be) based on who we are rather than what we think or believe. The common criticism of this view, then, is that our political decisions should be informed by our values and principles, rather than our identities. In reality, however, the distinction between identity and values is not at all clear-cut. Our histories, heritage, group memberships, gender, and a whole range of experiences form our identity, shape our values, and therefore form the foundation for our politics.

This does not mean that everyone who shares particular experiences or group characteristics will have the same values. Our identities are a complex interconnection of genetics, relationships and individual choices. A common misconception about identity politics is that it presumes a set of values and predicts a series of actions based merely on the groups to which a person belongs or a person’s experiences. No one actually believes in this kind of identity politics. Identity politics is the recognition that identity is a necessary but not sufficient factor for understanding how a person thinks, and predicting how that person will behave in particular circumstances. If pressed on this, very few people would disagree with this proposition.

Justice Samuel Alito, for example, responded to a question from Sen. Sam Coburn in his Senate confirmation hearing with the following:

…when a case comes before me involving, let's say, someone who is an immigrant … I can't help but think of my own ancestors, because it wasn't that long ago when they were in that position…and I do say to myself, "You know, this could be your grandfather, this could be your grandmother. They were not citizens at one time, and they were people who came to this country."…When I get a case about discrimination, I have to think about people in my own family who suffered discrimination because of their ethnic background or because of religion or because of gender. And I do take that into account.

This is identity politics. Does this mean we can predict how Justice Alito will decide every case involving an immigration dispute? Of course not. It means, however, that Alito believes his background and family experience shapes how he thinks about certain issues. He also implies that if he did not have this background or these experiences he would think about these cases differently.

Ronald Reagan similarly endorsed identity politics when he was campaigning for president. He promised, and subsequently fulfilled the promise, that his first appointment to the Supreme Court would be a woman. He said,

It is time for a woman to sit among our highest jurists. I will also seek out women to appoint to other federal courts in an effort to bring about a better balance on the federal bench.

Why did the court need a woman? The necessity of diversity, recognized by Reagan, is a necessity brought on by a belief in identity politics. Who a person is relates to how that person thinks, and what a person can bring to an organization that deliberates and makes decisions.

Reagan’s and Alito’s endorsement of identity politics notwithstanding, controversies over the role of identity in political decision-making are even greater when they involve the selection of judges. This is because the primary purpose of the judicial system is to produce decisions that apply objective interpretations of the rule of law to particular cases. In this context, admitting to the influence of ‘identity’ and ‘politics’ in the decision-making process seems to disregard the very purpose of the legal system.

Experience demonstrates, however, that even the best legal minds in the country, many of whom are sitting on the Supreme Court, often disagree when objectively applying legal principles to specific situations. To say that these decisions involve matters of perspective is not to say that there is no such thing as truth, but that a group of highly educated experts can reasonably disagree about the application of principles in particular cases.

Why do these disagreements occur? They occur in part because these experts have different values shaped by experiences that cause them to interpret facts and apply legal principles differently. This is why we value diversity (on the Court and elsewhere)—a diverse group of people, all with the necessary qualifications to sit on the Supreme Court, will be more likely to produce the best decision.

When it comes to applying principles and understanding events, there is little question that standpoint plays in a role. An acceptance of identity politics simply means agreement with Justice Alito and Ronald Reagan on this point. Most of us agree that our values are essentially linked to our identities. The debate following a judicial nomination should thus not be about whether identity politics is a good thing, but about what kind of values the nominee has, and how these might affect her interpretations and possible decisions.

Politics is, and always has been, essentially about identity. Those who criticize identity politics, even when it comes to the appointment of judges, are not accounting for the fact that our experiences shape who we are and what we believe. These critics also misunderstand one of the primary justifications for diversity in our pluralist democracy.