Why Financial Regulation is Essential

The Financial Times [1] article by Martin Wolf illustrates that a man who has alway been pro market can see the problems with no regulation and self policing of markets. While Wolf is right to point out that regulation and enforcement are also human activities that can generate their own follies, the work of the society is to set rules to protect people from the excesses of a given segment of society while maintaining the maximum freedom of those within the sector to be creative.

All agree now that:

• Risk management is appalling.
• Executive Compensation Incentives matter.
• Enhancing transparency is vital.
• Leverage is extreme.

What is not envisioned yet is how these changes will be made by a political system that is so dependent upon the campaign contributions from Wall Street. Self regulation is not viable. Having the market participants make the rules for themselves through legislative proxies who they fund is not much better. What is essential to this process is citizen scrutiny and participation. Citizens must blast through the tyranny of expertise that is used to intimidate them from participating in that which impacts their lives profoundly. They should also recognize that after the election the influence of voters will diminish for a couple of years.

Wolf quotes Willem Buiter, the sharp witted economist from the London School of Economics on self regulation.

“Self-regulation stands in relation to regulation the way self-importance stands in relation to importance.”

The remaining question is about citizen action in the USA. Are we self respecting enough to exert the will and effort to take on the self important and implement a system of sound regulation. Right now the betting is still on the money rather than the population. What are we going to do about it?

Why financial regulation is both difficult and essential [1]
By Martin Wolf, Financial Times
Published: April 15 2008  

Nice try; no cigar. That was my reaction to the attempt of the banking community to forestall additional regulation, by recommending “a suite of best practices to be embraced voluntarily”. It was also the reaction of the policymakers meeting in Washington over the weekend. More regulation is on its way. After frightening politicians and policymakers so badly, even the most optimistic banker must realise this. The question is whether the additional regulation will do any good.

In an interim report on “market best practices”, the Institute for International Finance, an association of bankers, offers devastating self-criticism.* Here then are some of the weaknesses it identifies: “deteriorating lending standards by certain originators of credit”; a “decline of underwriting standards”; an “excessive reliance on poorly understood, poorly performing and less than adequate ratings of structured products”; and “difficulties in identifying where exposures reside”. Would you buy a voluntary code from people who describe their own mistakes in this brutal manner? I thought not. There are two powerful additional reasons for not doing so

First, in such a fiercely competitive business, a voluntary code is almost certainly not worth the paper it is written on. When they can get away with behaving irresponsibly, some will do so. This puts strong pressure on others. That is what Chuck Prince, former chief executive officer of Citigroup, meant when he told the FT that “as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance”. So, as Willem Buiter of the London School of Economics remarks: “Self-regulation stands in relation to regulation the way self-importance stands in relation to importance.”

Second, the industry has form. The IIF itself was founded in 1983 in response to the developing country debt crisis. At that time, big parts of the west’s banking system were in effect bankrupt. Now, many upsets later, we have reached the “subprime crisis”. The IIF was created not only to represent the industry, but to improve its performance. It is clear that this has not worked.

Do not just take my word for it. Last month, Carmen Reinhart of the University of Maryland and Kenneth Rogoff of Harvard published an extraordinary paper on the long history of financial crises.** The chart shows that the incidence of banking crises (measured by the proportion of countries affected) has been as high since 1980 as in any period since 1800; that the incidence of crises is correlated with liberalisation of capital flows; and that there was, until 2007, a decline in the incidence of crises in the 2000s.

Yet why, I ask, should this industry have apparently failed to improve its standards of performance over the past century? After all, almost every other industry has done so. Consider how confident we are that the food we buy will not poison us. Yet adulterated food was once a threat.

Consider, by those standards, the failures of the banking industry, as admitted by the IIF itself. Its purely operational performance is now impressive. But competition does not work well in finance. The “product” of the financial industry is promises for an uncertain future, marketed as dreams that can readily become nightmares. Customers are readily swept away by exaggerated promises, irrational beliefs, misplaced trust and sheer skulduggery. So, too, are practitioners: basing risk management on limited data and inadequate models is a good example. Emotions count wherever uncertainties loom.